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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The court held that the Statute of Frauds which pertained to in-
vestment securities did bar plaintiff's suit. Section 8-319. Had there
been delivery, payment, confirmation or an admission of the sale, the
contract would have been enforceable, but under these facts, it had to
be in writing to be so.
[Annotator's Comment: The Statute of Frauds in Section 8-319
is similar in content to the Statute of Frauds for sales of goods in
Section 2-201. In a case which involved a contract analogous to the
one in the instant case, the Federal District Court in Pennsylvania held
Section 2-201 did not bar enforcement of the contract for it was an
employment contract and fully performed by the aggrieved party. Stone
v. Krylon, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1956). In this case, the
court could have construed the contract as an employment contract
with full performance by plaintiff which would place the contract out-
side the scope of Section 8-319, and it would be therefore enforceable.
The court's other alternative would have been to find that the parties
had entered into two separate contracts: the first was plaintiff's ob-
taining a selling agent in consideration for defendant's giving plaintiff
an option to purchase stock; the option (agreement to transfer the
shares) would be the second. Under this construction there would be
little doubt that if plaintiff could prove his allegations, the contract
would not be unenforceable because of either Section 8-319 or Section
2-201. The option itself would not be involved in the action.
From the facts it also seems that plaintiff had alleged that full pay-
ment was made to defendant in the form of services rather than money
which satisfied the performance exception to the requirement of a writ-
ing under Section 8-319(b). Plaintiff would be entitled to specific
performance of the contract if he could prove his allegation.]
ARTICLE 9: SECURED TRANSACTIONS; SALES OF ACCOUNTS,
CONTRACT RIGHTS AND CHATTEL PAPER
SECTION 9-103. Accounts, Contract Rights, General Intangibles and
Equipment Relating to Another Jurisdiction; and
Incoming Goods Already Subject to a Security In-
terest.
(3) If personal property other than that governed by subsections (1)
and (2) is already subject to a security interest when it is brought into this
state, the validity of the security interest in this state is to be determined
by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction where
the property was when the security interest attached. However, if the
parties to the transaction understood at the time that the security interest
attached that the property would be kept in this state and it was brought
into this state within 30 days after the security interest attached for pur-
poses other than transportation through this state, then the validity of the
security interest in this state is to be determined by the law of this state.
If the security , interest was already perfected under the law of the juris-
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diction where the property was when the security interest attached and
before being brought into this state, the security interest continues perfected
in this state for four months and also thereafter if within the four month
period it is perfected in this state. The security interest may also be per-
fected in this state after the expiration of the four month period; in such
case perfection dates from the time of perfection in this state. If the security
interest was not perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the property
was when the security interest attached and before being brought into this
state, it may be perfected in this state; in such case perfection dates from
the time of perfection in this state.
(4) Notwithstanding subsections (2) and (3), if personal property is
covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute of this state or of any
other jurisdiction which requires indication on a certificate of title of any
security interest in the property as a condition of perfection, then the
perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction which issued the
certificate.
* Hudiberg Chevrolet Inc. v. Ponce, 17 Wis. 2d 281, 116 N.W.2d 253
(1962).
See the Annotation to Section 2-403,"supra.
SECTION 9-302. When Filing Is Required to Perfect Security Inter-
est; Security Interests to Which Filing Provisions
of This Article Do Not Apply.
t In the Matter of Lux's Superette, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 368 (EA). Pa.
1962).
See the Annotation to Section 9-401, infra.
SECTION 9-307. Protection of Buyers of Goods.
(1) A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section
1-201) other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in
farming operations takes free of a security interest created by his seller
even though the security interest is perfected and even though the buyer
knows of its existence.
* Hudiberg Chevrolet Inc. v. Ponce, 17 Wis. 2d 281, 116 N.W.2d 253
(1962).
See the Annotation to Section 2-403, supra.
SECTION 9-311. Alienability of Debtor's Rights: Judicial Process.
The debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily
transferred (by way of sale, creation of a security interest, attachment,
levy, garnishment or other judicial process) notwithstanding a provision in
the security agreement prohibiting any transfer or making the transfer
constitute a default.
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United States v. Bregrnan, 306 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1962).
The President of Rudolph Motor Service was found guilty of
violating Section 7206(4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which
makes it unlawful to remove or conceal property upon which levy
is authorized by Section 6-331 of the Code. At a time when the firm
owed back taxes, the defendant made false entries in the corporate books
indicating that certain trailers in its possession had been repossessed.
On appeal, Bregman urged that, while Rudolph had possession of the
trailers, it did not have the unrestricted right to dispose of them. There-
fore, they were not Rudolph's "property."
The court held that state law determines to what extent a person
has "property." Section 9-311 gave Rudolph the right to dispose of the
trailers and also sanctioned processes of garnishment, attachment and
levy. Therefore, Rudolph had "property" under the statute.
[Annotator's Comment: Although the court is not explicit as to
the existence of a prior security interest in the trailers, such must be
assumed from the argument made by the defendant. The court's inter-
pretation of Section 9-311 is correct. Whatever the debtor's interest,
whether legal or equitable,.it may be transferred or attached even
though any disposition of the property may be a breach of the contract
between debtor and secured party. The secured party may not restrict
the alienability so as to affect rights acquired by a subsequent trans-
feree.]
SECTION 9-401. Place of Filing; Erroneous Filing; Removal of
Collateral.
(1) The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as
follows:
(b) when the collateral is goods which at the time the security
interest attaches are or are to become fixtures, then in the office where a
mortgage on the real estate concerned would be filed or recorded;
(2) A filing which is made in good faith in an improper place or not
in all of the places required by this section is nevertheless effective with
regard to any collateral as to which the filing complied with the requirements
of this Article and is also effective with regard to collateral covered by the
financing statement against any person who has knowledge of the contents
of such financing statement.
t In the Matter of Lux's Superette, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Pa
1962)
Before the bankrupt was organized, its principals submitted a pur-
chase order for fixtures and equipment to Kendall, describing the sale
as made to "Lux's Superette Inc." It was signed only by the individuals
without any corporate designation. Subsequent to incorporation, these
principals, now shareholders, signed a conditional sales contract covering
almost all the equipment in the original purchase order. This order was
filed at the Office of the Prothonotary of the county in which business
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was being done. Although the first payments were made by the stock-
holders, the remaining payments were made by the corporation. After
the adjudication of bankruptcy, Kendall and the assignee of the sales
contract filed a reclamation petition in which they alleged that the
property belonged to these principals rather than the corporation. If the
property were found to be that of the corporation, they alleged that
they held a perfected security interest.
In affirming the referee's dismissal, the court found that there was
sufficient evidence to indicate that the corporation was the owner of the
property. Under the 1954 Code, effective as to this transaction, Section
9-401(1)(a) provided that proper filing must be completed with the
Secretary of the Commonwealth and with the Prothonotary of the
county in which the debtor does all his business. Admittedly, there was
no filing with the Secretary. The creditors sought to excuse themselves by
reason of their good faith filing under Section 9-401(2) but this was
rejected because the conditions under which that section is applicable
were not in existence here. Therefore, the security interest was not
perfected.
(Annotator's Comment: Under the 1958 text of the Code, effective
in 1960, the place of filing for security interests in fixtures, is the office
where a mortgage on the real estate concerned would be filed or re-
corded. The relevant Section is 9-401(1) (b).1
In re Smith, 205 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
See the Annotation to Section 9-403, infra.
SECTION 9-402. Formal Requisites of Financing Statement; Amend-
ments.
( 1 ) A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and
the secured party, gives an address of the secured party from which informa-
tion concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address
of the debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing
the items, of collateral. A financing statement may be filed before a security
agreement is made or a security interest otherwise attaches. When the
financing statement covers crops growing or to be grown or goods which
are or are to become fixtures, the statement must also contain a description
of the real estate concerned. A copy of the security agreement is sufficient as
a financing statement if it contains the above information and is signed by
both parties.
In re Smith, 205 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
See the Annotation to Section 9-403, infra.
SECTION 9-403. What Constitutes Filing; Duration of Filing; Effect
of Lapsed Filing; Duties of Filing Officer.
(1) Presentation for filing of a financing statement and tender of the
filing fee or acceptance of the statement by the filing officer constitutes filing
under this Article.
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In re Smith, 205 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
On December 8, 1960, the Metropolitan Equipment Co. and the
bankrupt entered into a contract for the purchase of certain equipment.
Metropolitan presented the contract for filing but the Secretary of the
Commonwealth returned it because of the failure to include the mailing
address of the debtor. However, the contract was accepted by the
Prothonotary of Berks County, the debtor's place of business. Metro-
politan never submitted a new statement to the Secretary. Metropolitan
claimed that, by reason of Section 9-403(1), it had satisfied the filing
requirement through its attempt to file. The referee dismissed plain-
tiff's reclamation petition because he found no perfected security in-
terest.
In interpreting Section 9-403(1), the court held that the broad
language of that section must be considered in relation to the specific
requirements set forth under Section 9-402. One of these requirements
is the inclusion of the debtor's mailing address in the filed statement.
Therefore, no effective statement was ever "presented for filing."
The company tried to bring itself within the provisions of Section
9-401(2) but the court rejected its argument. The filing in Berks
County did not contain the debtor's address either so it did not "comply
with the requirements of this Article." In addition, there was no evidence
that any creditor had knowledge of the filing. On reargument, it was
discovered that the statement filed in Berks County had contained the
debtor's address. The case was remanded.
[Annotator's Comment: The Code, in adopting a notice filing
concept, imposed minimal formalities for the financing statements to
be filed. One of them is the address of both debtor and secured party.
This is essential (1) to identify the debtor and (2) to offer the source
of further information to interested third parties. It is not a "minor
error" which does not mislead and hence not invalidate the filing under
Section 9-402(5). The filing officer was correct in refusing to accept the
deficient statement and the court properly held there had been no pre-
sentment for filing as required by Section 9-403(1).
Even though the trustee himself knew of the contents of the locally
filed statement which apparently met the minimum formalities, he is
probably not a lien creditor with knowledge and his own knowledge is
irrelevant. In re Babcock Box Co., 200 F. Supp. 80 (D. Mass. 1961)
(3 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 435 (1962)).]
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